MI5 Flags China-Funded Research by Over 100 UK-Linked Academics That Improves Beijing’s Espionage Capability

MI5, Britain’s domestic security service, said Sept. 30, 2026, that more than 100 academics linked to UK institutions had contributed to research projects funded through the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI), an institute the agency says has “very strong ties” to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), its civilian intelligence service. MI5 said CGTRI’s “primary purpose” is to fund academic research that “directly improves” the MSS’s technical capability for espionage.

MI5 said UK academics had contributed to CGTRI-funded projects on artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, covert communications systems and steganography, the concealment of information inside other data. It also said some academics may not have known CGTRI was funding the Chinese research project they contributed to and that some institutions and individuals had engaged with the institute in good faith because the MSS connection had been obfuscated.

Jarvis Tells Universities to End the Arrangements

The agency advised UK academic institutions to immediately review ongoing and planned collaboration with CGTRI and told researchers to establish the ultimate funding source when working with Chinese institutions.

Security Minister Dan Jarvis wrote to university vice-chancellors, the heads of British universities, urging them to end arrangements with CGTRI. A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in London rejected the allegation, calling it “imaginary and purely fabricated.” CGTRI is sometimes translated as the China Academy of General Technology (CAGT).

Archived Notices Show the Fund’s Earlier Priorities

CGTRI maintained a joint fund with the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), China’s main public funder of basic science. The fund was announced in 2015.

A review of archived fund notices by UK-China Transparency, a research group tracking UK-China institutional links, found that early priorities included coverless information hiding, information hiding in natural images, post-quantum public-key cryptography and mobile communications security.

The same review found that applicants had to consult CGTRI’s fund office before applying. CGTRI staff were required to participate in projects, while project outputs had to be supplied to CGTRI.

The 2016 priorities expanded into Tibetan and Uyghur text recognition, lip-based identity recognition, anonymous-communications detection, chip information-leakage analysis, and target localization and tracking.

2026 Notices Add Password and Cryptocurrency Work

Archived 2026 notices reviewed by the group list AI-agent sensitive-information leakage and auditing, chip security, AI security testing, large-language-model password generation and guessing, cryptocurrency transaction-graph analysis, underwater acoustic localization, and newer steganography methods using audio and video.

The password-generation and cryptocurrency research were listed in the fund notices, rather than in MI5’s Sept. 30 alert.

Grant Codes Appear on Published Papers

The same review found U-series grant codes on papers whose co-authors were affiliated with 15 UK institutions, including University College London, Cambridge, Manchester, Southampton, Warwick and Sheffield. It assessed 16 grant codes as certainly or likely connected to CGTRI and said its list was not exhaustive.

Those affiliations do not establish that the UK co-authors received CGTRI funding, knew CGTRI was involved, or had any relationship with Chinese intelligence. MI5 did not accuse the academics of committing an offense.

MI5 Points Researchers to National Security Act

MI5 said institutions and individuals continuing research ultimately funded by CGTRI should take independent legal advice. The agency pointed researchers to the National Security Act 2023. Section 3 covers materially assisting a foreign intelligence service in UK-related activity, including where a person knows or ought reasonably to know the conduct is likely to do so, and carries up to 14 years in prison. Section 17 covers obtaining, accepting or retaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service, also up to 14 years; agreeing to accept one carries up to 10 years.

MI5 did not say any of the academics had committed either offense. Its alert called on institutions and researchers to review the funding behind their collaborations and obtain legal advice where CGTRI remains involved.